

Back to the Futu^H^H^H^H ah screw it, it's
all broken – Practical GPS Spoofing

Dave/Karit (@nzkarit) – ZX Security
BSidesCBR 2017


- ▶ Dave, Karit, @nzkarit
- ▶ Security Consultant/Pen Tester at ZX Security in Wellington, NZ
- ▶ Enjoy radio stuff
- ▶ Pick Locks and other physical stuff at Locksport

Today

- ▶ GPS (Global Positioning System)
- ▶ GPS Spoofing on the cheap
- ▶ Let's change the time!
 - ▶ So what?
- ▶ Serial Data
 - ▶ Pulse Per Second (PPS)
- ▶ How we can detect spoofing



- ▶ Tells us where we are
- ▶ Tells us the time



We Trust GPS Right? Right?????

- ▶ Anyone in the room not currently trust GPS locations?
- ▶ Anyone in the room not currently trust GPS time?
- ▶ Anyone feel that this will change by the end of the talk?

You have to trust it right?

- ▶ GPS too important to life?
- ▶ GPS must be great and robust? Right?
- ▶ Important services rely on it:
 - ▶ Uber
 - ▶ Tinder

And some other things as well

- ▶ NTP Time Source
- ▶ Plane Location
- ▶ Ship Location
- ▶ Tracking Armoured Vans
- ▶ Taxi law in NZ no longer knowledge requirement

So why don't I trust it?

Truck driver has GPS jammer, accidentally jams Newark airport


An engineering firm worker in New Jersey has a GPS jammer so his bosses don't know where he is all the time. However, his route takes him close to Newark airport, and his jammer affects its satellite systems.



▶ Have GPS jammers to mess with Uber



Jammers Boring.....



SKU: GM01/G
LIGHTER TYPE GPS CAR
JAMMER TO PROTECT YOUR
CAR
\$48.50

ADD TO CART

Add to Wishlist
Add to Compare



SKU: GM08P/EU
8 BANDS GSM CDMA 3G 4G
GPS L1 WIFI LOJACK CELL
PHONE JAMMER,BLOCKING
GPS TRACKER,WIFI,LOJACK
AND 4G MOBILE PHONE ALL
IN ONE (FOR EUROPE)
\$300.00

ADD TO CART

Add to Wishlist
Add to Compare



SKU: GM08B/V
8 ANTENNA ALL IN ONE FOR
ALL
CELLULAR,GPS,WIFI,LOJACK,WALK
TALKY,VHF,UHF JAMMER
BLOCKER
\$390.00

ADD TO CART

Add to Wishlist
Add to Compare



SKU: BAG01
CELLPHONE GPS SIGNAL
TRACKING BLOCKER POUCH
CASE BAG. PREVENT
TRACKING & HACKING
\$18.00

ADD TO CART

Add to Wishlist
Add to Compare



**GPS Buster - Mini
Wireless GPS L1 and
L2 Signal Jammer**

US\$52.88

Add:



**GPS Jammer For Use
In Car - 3 To 6 Meters
Coverage**

US\$37.30


Add:



**Black High Power
Portable Anti - Spy
GPS Jammer**

US\$40.25


Add:



**3 to 6 Meters
Coverage Black Car
GPS Jammer**

US\$22.91

Add:



Exclusive: Iran hijacked US drone, says Iranian engineer (Video)

In an exclusive interview, an engineer working to unlock the secrets of the captured RQ-170 Sentinel says they exploited a known vulnerability and tricked the US drone into landing in Iran.

By **Scott Peterson**, Staff writer  **Payam Faramarzi***, Correspondent | DECEMBER 15, 2011




Professor fools \$80M superyacht's GPS receiver on the high seas

Todd Humphreys says defenses are scant: "nobody knows how to use a sextant."

by Cyrus Farivar - Jul 30, 2013 12:30pm NZST

[Share](#) [Tweet](#) [Email](#) 97



A team from the University of Texas spoofed the GPS receiver on a live superyacht in the Ionian Sea.



Time is on my side

Forging Wireless Timing Signals to Attack the NTP Server

Yuwei Zheng @HITB
Haoqi Shan @HITB
From: Qihoo360 Unicorn Team

Time is on my side




360UNICORNTTEAM

Now we are talking

 **osqzss / gps-sdr-sim**

 Code

 Issues **0**

 Pull requests **0**

Software-Defined GPS Signal Simulator

What we need

- ▶ A box
- ▶ An SDR with TX
 - ▶ I used a BladeRF
 - ▶ HackRF
 - ▶ USRP
- ▶ So less US\$500 in hardware
- ▶ Also some aluminium foil to make a Faraday Cage
- ▶ So it is now party trick simple and cheap
 - ▶ This is the big game changer from the past

Setup



@amm0nra patented Faraday Cage

- ▶ Make sure you measure signal outside to ensure none is leaking
- ▶ Be careful





- ▶ INAL (I'm not a lawyer)
- ▶ GPS isn't Open Spectrum
- ▶ So Faraday Cage
 - ▶ Keep all the juicy GPS goodness to yourself

Remember

- ▶ Your SDR kit is going to be closer to the device
 - ▶ So much stronger signal
 - ▶ Got to have line of sight though
- ▶ GPS Orbits ~20,000 km
 - ▶ So signals weak
 - ▶ Signal is weaker than the noise floor





Noise Floor



Right so what can we do?

- ▶ Got some simulator software and a bladeRF what could people get up to?

A trip to Bletchley Park?



How does the tool work?

- ▶ Two methods, first one two steps
- ▶ 1. Generate the data for broadcast
 - ▶ About 1 GB per minute
 - ▶ Static location or a series of locations to make a path
 - ▶ Has an Almanac file which has satellite locations
 - ▶ Uses Almanac to select what satellites are required for that location at that time
- ▶ 2. Broadcast the data

How does the tool work?

- ▶ Generate in real time
- ▶ Need a fast enough computer
- ▶ I. Generate and broadcast
- ▶ In author's words this is an experimental feature



- ▶ By default only 5 mins of transmit data
 - ▶ Need to change a value in code for longer
 - ▶ Approx. 1GB a minute hence the limit
- ▶ Pi3 about three times slower than real time, so must be precomputed
 - ▶ Pi3 there is a file size limit
 - ▶ <4GB from my experience, so 4-5 minutes of broadcast per file
 - ▶ Can just chain a series of pre computed files together

- ▶ To do the path give the generator a series of locations at 10Hz
- ▶ Can't just give a series of lat/long in a csv ☹️
 - ▶ ECEF Vectors or
 - ▶ NMEA Data rows
 - ▶ There are convertors online 😊

A Path

12 May 2016 14:02:36

MAP STATISTICS

Wellington Harbour

1,0km

Recording 00:12:01 1.46 km 0 km/h

So what can we do?


▶ with GPS spoofing

\$\$\$

- ▶ Keep an armoured van on track as you take it to your secret underground lair
- ▶ Have a track following its normal route while drive it somewhere else



Uber trip with no distance?



The screenshot shows an Uber receipt for a trip. The total fare is NZ\$ 10.00. The fare breakdown is as follows:


FARE BREAKDOWN	
Base Fare	1.00
Distance	5.00
Time	3.00
Subtotal	NZ\$ 9.00

The trip was charged to a Visa Payment Method for a total of NZ\$ 10.00. The trip details at the bottom show:

CAR	KILOMETERS	TRIP TIME
uberX	3.00	00:03

Additional details include a driver profile picture and the text "You rode with [Driver Name]".

Queenstown Airport Approach



- ▶ For places like Queenstown planes have Required Navigation Performance Authorisation Required (RNP AR)
 - ▶ When not visual conditions
- ▶ As approach is through valleys
 - ▶ Can't use ground based instrument landing systems
- ▶ If go off course going to hit the ground



Can we use this to change time?

- ▶ NTPd will take GPS over serial out of the box
- ▶ The NTP boxes also use NTPd behind the UI
 - ▶ NTPd uses it own license, so easy to spot in manuals etc



- ▶ If you move time too much $>5\text{min}$ NTPd shutdown
- ▶ No log messages as to why
- ▶ When starting NTP you get “Time has been changed”
- ▶ And NTP will accept the GPS even if it differs greatly from the local clock

- ▶ With debugging enabled
 - ▶ Feb 24 02:36:21 ntpgps ntpd[2009]: 0.0.0.0 0417 07 panic_stop +2006 s; set clock manually within 1000 s.
 - ▶ Feb 24 02:36:21 ntpgps ntpd[2009]: 0.0.0.0 041d 0d kern kernel time sync disabled

- ▶ If NTPd crashes but starts via watchdog or a manual restart
 - ▶ Will people look deeper?
 - ▶ Will people check the time is correct?

So how can we move time?

- ▶ We can't do big jumps in time
- ▶ We will have to change time in steps

Introducing TardGPS

- ▶ Python Script
- ▶ Wraps the real time version of the GPS Simulator
- ▶ Moves time back in steps
 - ▶ So as not to crash NTPd

- ▶ Talked in more detail at Kiwicon 2016
- ▶ Slides:
 - ▶ https://zxsecurity.co.nz/presentations/201611_Kiwicon-ZXSecurity_GPSSpoofing_LetsDoTheTimewarpAgain.pdf
- ▶ Code:
 - ▶ <https://github.com/zxsecurity/tardgps>

Local machine

Mon Sep 26 22:49:26 UTC 2016

Target machine


Mon Sep 26 22:49:28 UTC 2016

```
user@ubuntu:~/tardgps$ ./tardgps.py
```

Time difference
(to nearest minute)
0 min

Timebased One Time Password

- ▶ TOTP
- ▶ E.g. Google Auth
- ▶ A new token every 30 seconds



TOTP

```
user@ubuntu: ~  
user@ubuntu:~$ date  
Sat Oct 29 22:59:19 UTC 2016  
user@ubuntu:~$ ssh user@localhost  
Password:  
Verification code: 568802  
Welcome to Ubuntu 16.04 LTS (GNU/Linux 4.4.0-22-generic x86_64)  
  
* Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com/  
Last login: Sat Oct 29 22:37:09 2016 from 192.168.247.1  
user@ubuntu:~$ logout  
Connection to localhost closed.  
user@ubuntu:~$ date  
Sat Oct 29 23:05:08 UTC 2016  
user@ubuntu:~$ date  
Sat Oct 29 22:59:02 UTC 2016  
user@ubuntu:~$ ssh user@localhost  
Password:  
Verification code: 568802  
Welcome to Ubuntu 16.04 LTS (GNU/Linux 4.4.0-22-generic x86_64)  
  
* Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com/  
Last login: Sat Oct 29 22:59:43 2016 from ::1  
user@ubuntu:~$
```

Setting up TOTP for SSH

- ▶ *Do you want to disallow multiple uses of the same authentication token? This restricts you to one login about every 30s, but it increases your chances to notice or even prevent man-in-the-middle attacks (y/n)*

- ▶ Had a look around
- ▶ There was a big mix of option for TOTP reuse
 - ▶ Defaults for both (allow and not allow)
 - ▶ Not always text describing what option means
- ▶ Some didn't implement the don't reuse feature



- ▶ Make sure there is a setting related to reuse
- ▶ Make sure it is set to not allow reuse

Also other 2FA solutions

- ▶ HOTP - HMAC-based one-time password
 - ▶ Also in Google Auth
- ▶ U2F
 - ▶ One token can be used on many sites
 - ▶ One user can subscribe more than one token
- ▶ Friends don't let friends SMS
 - ▶ NIST is recommending deprecation



- ▶ SUDO counts time in a different way, using OS Clock Ticks
- ▶ so you can't roll back time and bypass sudo password check timeout
- ▶ sudoer file `timestamp_timeout=X`
- ▶ Uptime works in a similar way

Uptime during jump

```
pi@ntpgps:~ $ date
Mon Nov 7 01:40:30 UTC 2016
pi@ntpgps:~ $ uptime
01:40:36 up 4 min, 2 users, load average: 0.00, 0.04, 0.03
pi@ntpgps:~ $ date
Fri Nov 18 13:01:14 UTC 2016
pi@ntpgps:~ $ uptime
13:01:17 up 7 min, 2 users, load average: 0.21, 0.08, 0.05
pi@ntpgps:~ $ █
```


- ▶ Incident Response becomes interesting when your logging starts showing:
 - ▶ Nov 18 13:45:43 important-server: Hacker logs out
 - ▶ Nov 18 13:46:54 important-server: Hacker performs l33t hack
 - ▶ Nov 18 13:47:47 important-server: Hacker logs in
- ▶ Through time manipulation or cron running: date set 'some random time'
- ▶ Also if move time forward could make logs roll and purge
 - ▶ If no central logging



- ▶ What can we do if we have access to the data centre roof?
- ▶ GPS unit with aerial on roof serial down
- ▶ GPS unit in server and radio down wire from roof
 - ▶ Attach transmitter to wire with attenuator
- ▶ Use server 127.0.20.0
 - ▶ ntpd then knows to look at /dev/gps0 and /dev/pps0 for import

- ▶ NMEA Data – Serial Data (/dev/gps0)
 - ▶ \$GPGGA,062237.000,4117.4155,S,17445.3752,E,1,9,0.97,177.1,M,19.0,M,,*4A
 - ▶ \$GPRMC,062237.000,A,4117.4155,S,17445.3752,E,0.16,262.97,120217,,,A*7E
 - ▶ Hour, Minute, Second, Day, Month, Year
- ▶ Pulse Per Second – PPS (/dev/pps0)

Pulse Per Second - PPS



- ▶ Doesn't contain time value
- ▶ It indicates where a second starts
- ▶ Less processing on the GPS Receiver so comes through in a more timely manner
- ▶ Rising edge can be in micro or nano second accuracy

- ▶ I had NTPd running on a raspberry pi
- ▶ GPS receiver view UART on GPIO pins
- ▶ One wire was for PPS

- ▶ Link the PPS pin to another GPIO pin
- ▶ Set that pin high and low as applicable

So what happens

- ▶ If run PPS with a different timing the NEMA data will keep correcting
- ▶ So will keep pulling it back
- ▶ So within ± 1 second
- ▶ Maybe an issue in finance, telecoms and energy
 - ▶ Where fractions of a second count

Can we just remove the NMEA data?

- ▶ If pull serial NTPd Tx wire
- ▶ Stops the source in NTPd, even if getting PPS signal
- ▶ So can't manipulate time just through PPS manipulation

So got to replicate the NMEA data as well

- ▶ So wrote a tool for that
- ▶ Introducing NMEAdesync
- ▶ Is on Github now:
 - ▶ <https://github.com/zxsecurity/NMEAdesync>

- ▶ Similar in concept to tardgps
- ▶ Though changing the data in the NMEA data rather than GPS Signal

- ▶ Adjust the time
- ▶ Adjust how fast a second is
- ▶ Also does the PPS generation

- ▶ Offers more control than tardgps
 - ▶ No GPS signal tom foolery

- ▶ Python Script
 - ▶ stdout \$GPRMC and \$GPGGA
 - ▶ PPS high/low on pin
 - ▶ Loop
- ▶ socat stdout to `/dev/pts/X`
- ▶ Symlink `/dev/pts/X` to `/dev/gps0`
- ▶ ntpd takes it from there

- ▶ I could get similar behaviour as tardgps
- ▶ But simpler to execute as don't have the radio aspect
- ▶ Though will require physical access to the roof of the building

How can we detect this?

▶ GPS Signal Spoofing

- ▶ Talked in more detail at Unrestcon 2016
- ▶ Slides on ZX Security's Site:
 - ▶ <https://zxsecurity.co.nz/events.html>
- ▶ Code on ZX Security's Github:
 - ▶ <https://github.com/zxsecurity/gpsnitch>

What does GPSnitch Do?

- ▶ Time offset
- ▶ SNR Values
- ▶ SNR Range
- ▶ Location Stationary

Useful for

- ▶ NTP Servers
- ▶ Also GPS units wanting to know location

NTP Setups to avoid GPS Spoofing

- ▶ 3+ Upstream
 - ▶ Allows for bad ticker detection and removal
- ▶ Multiple Types of upstream
 - ▶ I.e. don't pick 3 GPS based ones
 - ▶ GPS, Atomic
- ▶ Don't pick just one upstream provider
 - ▶ Rouge admin problem
 - ▶ Maybe one overseas so gives you a coarse sanity check of time

- ▶ But GPS is travelling across the air...
- ▶ Consider atomic, caesium, rubidium

- ▶ Incorporate GPSnitch
- ▶ Additional logging for when daemon shuts down due to a time jump
- ▶ On daemon restart after a large time jump occurs, prompt user to accept time jump



Our involvement on the globe

- **European Airports** - NTP time synchronization in air traffic control centers
- **Mobile operators** - NTP servers for global time sync
- **All locale powerplants** - NTP servers for global time sync
- **Atomic powerplants** - NTP servers for time sync



GPS TIME Server

GPSDIN Ver: 2.01

Release: 06/2009

GPSDIN Ver: 2.01
Release: 06/2009

Receiver:ANTARIS
NMEA

visible satellites 30
GPS Receiver Status O.K.

Last Sync Sun Mar 12 19:45:00 2017

- ▶ Asked if was latest and how to update
 - ▶ No mention on site
 - ▶ No mention in the “manual”

Their reply

Enquiry about Din rail NtpServer

Inbox x



 **MT industries, s.r.o.** <[REDACTED]@ora-ltd.com>

7:48 AM (1 hour ago)



to me 

Hello,

Thank you for your purchase. Yes, you have last FW version in your device. There is no way to upgrade it remotely. But hopefully you won't have any problems with it despite the age. If so, please, let me know - we are working on the new version of the device and we would be happy for as much feedback as possible.

Kind Regards, [REDACTED]

- ▶ **NMEA Snitch?**
 - ▶ Ratios of the different NMEA sentences
 - ▶ Timing of sentences
 - ▶ Sentence order
 - ▶ PPS range, accuracy

Thanks

- ▶ bladeRF – Awesome customer service and great kit
- ▶ Takuji Ebinuma – for GitHub code
- ▶ @amm0nra – General SDR stuff and Ideas
- ▶ @bogan & ZX Security – encouragement, kit, time
- ▶ Fincham – GPS NTP Kit
- ▶ Unicorn Team – Ideas from their work
- ▶ Everyone else who has suggested ideas / given input
- ▶ BSidesCBR – For having me
- ▶ You – For hanging around and having a listen
- ▶ GPSd – Daemon to do the GPS stuff
- ▶ GPS3 – Python Library for GPSd

GPSnitch

- ▶ Slides: https://zxsecurity.co.nz/presentations/201607_Unrestcon-ZXSecurity_GPSSpoofing.pdf
- ▶ Code: <https://github.com/zxsecurity/gpsnitch>

GPSnitch

- ▶ Slides: https://zxsecurity.co.nz/presentations/201607_Unrestcon-ZXSecurity_GPSSpoofing.pdf
- ▶ Code: <https://github.com/zxsecurity/gpsnitch>

tardgps



- ▶ Code: <https://github.com/zxsecurity/tardgps>

How To

▶ Code

- ▶ <https://github.com/osqzss/gps-sdr-sim/>
- ▶ <https://github.com/osqzss/bladeGPS>
- ▶ <https://github.com/keith-citrenbaum/bladeGPS> - Fork of bladeGPS for Linux

▶ Blog

- ▶ <http://en.wooyun.io/2016/02/04/41.html>

▶ Lat Long Alt to ECEF

- ▶ http://www.sysense.com/products/ecef_ll_alt_converter/index.html

Libraries Used

- ▶ **GPS3 Python Library**
 - ▶ <https://github.com/wadda/gps3>
- ▶ **GPSd Daemon**
 - ▶ <http://www.catb.org/gpsd/>

References

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- ▶ <http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/07/professor-spoofs-80m-superyachts-gps-receiver-on-the-high-seas/>
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- ▶ <http://www.theairlinepilots.com/forumarchive/aviation-regulations/rnp-ar.pdf>
- ▶ <http://www.stuff.co.nz/auckland/68493319/Blessie-Gotingco-trial-GPS-expert-explains-errors-in-data>
- ▶ <https://conference.hitb.org/hitbsecconf2016ams/materials/D2T1%20-%20Yuwei%20Zheng%20and%20Haoqi%20Shan%20-%20Forging%20a%20Wireless%20Time%20Signal%20to%20Attack%20NTP%20Servers.pdf>
- ▶ <http://www.securityweek.com/ntp-servers-exposed-long-distance-wireless-attacks>
- ▶ <http://www.gps.gov/multimedia/images/constellation.jpg>

References

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- ▶ http://www.microwavejournal.com/legacy_assets/images/11106_Fig1x250.gif
- ▶ https://pbs.twimg.com/profile_images/2822987562/849b8c47d20628d70b85d25f53993a76_400x400.png
- ▶ https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/49/GPS_Block_IIIa.jpg
- ▶ http://www.synchbueno.com/components/com_jshopping/files/img_products/full_1-131121210043Y1.jpg
- ▶ <https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.google.android.apps.authenticator2&hl=en>
- ▶ <https://www.yubico.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/YubiKey-4-1000-2016-444x444.png>
- ▶ <http://www.gpsntp.com/about/>
- ▶ https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4a/GPS_roof_antenna_dsc06160.jpg